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Design and Analysis of Cryptographic Primitives

Design and Analysis of Cryptographic Primitives

One of the strengths of the Cryptography Group at Royal Holloway is to design and formally analyse the security of a variety of cryptographic primitive. This is typically done within the framework of provable security, a modern cryptography approach which allows to reason about the security guarantees of a scheme or protocol using formal definitions and rigorous proofs. Our expertise in this area includes design and analysis of public-key encryption primitives, both basic and advanced, digital signature schemes and their variants. We focus on finding constructions with minimal assumptions, with maximal possible security.

  • Chvojka P, Jager T, Kakvi SA. Offline Witness Encryption with Semi-adaptive Security. ACNS (1) 2020: 231-250.
  • Blazy O, Kakvi SA. Skipping the q in Group Signatures. INDOCRYPT 2020: 553-575.
  • Kakvi SA. SoK: Comparison of the Security of Real World RSA Hash-and-Sign Signatures. SSR 2020: 91-113
  • Kakvi SA: On the Security of RSA-PSS in the Wild. SSR 2019: 23-34 
  • Liu J, Jager T, Kakvi SA, Warinschi B. How to build time-lock encryption. Des. Codes Cryptogr. 86(11): 2549-2586 (2018)
  • Jager T, Kakvi SA, May A. On the Security of the PKCS#1 v1.5 Signature Scheme. CCS 2018: 1195-1208
  • Blazy O, Kakvi SA, Kiltz E, Pan J. Tightly-Secure Signatures from Chameleon Hash Functions. Public Key Cryptography 2015: 256-279
  • Kakvi SA, Kiltz E, May A. Certifying RSA. ASIACRYPT 2012: 404-414
  • Kakvi SA, Kiltz E. Optimal Security Proofs for Full Domain Hash, Revisited. EUROCRYPT 2012: 537-553

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